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Norms of Life
Introduction 
Life can only be understood in terms of norms. By norm I mean a principle 
that divides things into two unequal classes. By life, I mean all life: biological, 
human or artificial life. By understanding, I refer to an actual human activity, 
not, for instance, some potential divine grasp of the world. 
I will proceed in the first part of this paper by offering a preliminary definition
of norm and then fleshing it out by showing how norms are involved in three 
kinds of life: biological life, linguistic life, and the life of a self. In the second 
part, I will explore how these different kinds of norms interrelate, an 





Examples of norms abound. The norm of truth divides propositions into two 
classes: true ones and false ones. Health is a norm that distinguishes bodily 
states that are well from those that are diseased. The purpose of a knife -- to 
cut -- sets a norm dividing sharp knives from blunt, those which fail to fulfill the
purpose. Actions can succeed or fail. Moral actions can be good or evil. A 
computer program can fulfill its purpose, or have a bug and fail. A coin may be 
genuine or counterfeit. 
A preliminary definition of a norm is a principle that divides reality, things, or
events into two sets: those in accord with the norm and those not in accord 
with it. A norm sets an ideal against which reality is measured. It is similar to a 
value. Charles Taylor uses the term "bivalence."
Kinds of norms
I claim that all life is normative, but I don't mean that all life is regulated by 
the same norms.
Biological life is governed by functional norms. An organism is organized into
organs. Each organ has some function in the organism that sets a norm for the 
organ. The function of a heart is to pump blood. If it does, it fulfill its function; if
it doesn't, it has failed. 
Linguistic life is subject to rules established by the particular linguistic 
community. In English, for instance, the verb must agree in number with its 
subject. "Dogs run" is grammatically correct. "Dogs runs" is incorrect. Not all 
language rules are grammatical, but they all establish norms that distinguish 
correct use from incorrect.
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"Be thyself" is a normative injunction. A narrative self constitutes itself by 
establishing ideals for its life, norms against which it can judge its beliefs and 
actions. If at some point in the past I decide I'm going to be a kind person, that 
decision sets up a narrative norm which determines whether my future actions 
are "truly my own" or "failures to be myself." 
I will focus only on these three kinds of norms, though there are many other 
realms of life -- cultural, social, political and so on -- each with their own 
distinctive norms. (I will mention moral norms only to say that I will not 
mention them.)
Non-normative reality
In contrast with the normativity of life, physical reality is non-normative. At 
the birth of Modern Science, Hobbes and Galileo, Descartes and Kant 
conceptualized the material world as made up of objects and events related to 
each other by causal laws. The paradigm is the impact of a billiard ball causing 
a second ball to react according to a mathematically precise law. The 
proponents of this "mechanistic" conception were clear that they were 
rejecting the idea that nature is normative. They explicitly repudiated the 
Aristotelian notion of indwelling forms whose teloi explained the behaviour of 
objects. Heavy objects do not seek their natural, low place, as Aristotle held; 
rather, they are caused to fall by the external force of gravity. We should not 
ask the purpose of the sun rising every morning; we should explain the the 
movement of the earth and planets in accordance with the mathematical, 
causal laws of the Solar system. Normativity has no place in the true scientific 
conception of the world; science should seek facts that are value-free.
The mechanists exiled norms, values and purposes from the world: they are 
appearances, not components of reality.1 In so far as they have any being at 
all, they are subjective -- denizens of our minds, or of the Mind of God. The 
purposes of God are inscrutable, so attempts to investigate purposes in nature 
border on blasphemy. The goal of human scientists should be modest: discover
the causal laws, preferably mathematical, that govern the behaviour of 
material objects. 
But mechanists have a problem. Claims made by physicists should be true, 
not false. So physicists are governed by norms! Physicists themselves, then, 
cannot be part of physical reality. The typical way out of this dilemma, in the 
Early Modern period, is to position the norm-governed scientific knower outside
of the realm of causal physical reality and so the period ends up with a 
metaphysical dualism of mind and matter.
For mechanists, life is an enigma; it does not fit easily into the dualist 
scheme. One could place biological life into the mental side of the dualism -- 
perhaps this is what the "Vitalists" do -- but the materiality of life makes this 
implausible. To fit life into the material side, mechanists typically attempt a 
"reduction:" if we cannot understand a blade of grass directly in terms of 
causal laws, we should decompose the phenomenon into smaller, atomic parts 
and apply physical laws to the parts. Somehow this reductive process will 
explain the original phenomenon, though we need a lot of hand waving.
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2 Norms of Organic life 
Norms are constitutive
So let me turn now to biological life. It is the normativity of life that makes it 
resistant to such atomistic reductionism. The beating of an individual heart can
be explained by reference to the firing of many tiny nerves, and these can be 
explained by even tinier molecular processes. However, the function of the 
heart -- its telos is to pump blood -- is normative and is left unexplained by 
such reduction. 2
What do I mean by a "function?" The word has many uses in English.3 A 
university convocation is a function; there are mathematical and computational
functions; the chair of a Colloquium is a function. But even when we close in on
the sense I need (e.g., the function of a heart) there are a cluster of equivocal 
meanings. The function of my house alarm is to protect me from break-ins. I've 
had no break-ins, so it has never functioned. Except for one annoying night 
when the alarm went off due to a mal-function, it has carried out its function 
perfectly, that is, by not functioning. The word is used in two different ways 
here. Hearts beat intermittently: during the resting part of the cycle -- the 
diastolic part -- the heart rests and so carries out its function (sense 1) by not 
functioning (sense 2). Only in sense 1 is function normative; in sense 2, it is 
purely mechanistic. From here on, I'll be using the word only in sense 1.4
The heart is defined by its function, not by the mechanistic processes that 
undergrid it. An artificial heart that successfully pumps blood is still a heart, 
though the underlying mechanism is entirely different. Aristotle claims that it is
the form an eye (or of anything) that makes it what it is. By form here he 
means function, not shape. The form of the eye is defined by it telos: to see. 
The "eye" of a stone statue, he says, is an eye only by equivocation; since it 
cannot fulfill its function, it is not a real eye, no matter how accurately the 
sculptor has reproduced the shape.5 The function of an organ is not an add-on 
to a pre-existing entity. It is the function that constitutes the entity in the first 
place, that makes it what it is: the functional norm is constitutive of its very 
being. It is not that organs first come into existence and then, secondarily, are 
subordinated to some norm. Norms are co-natural with organs; it is the norm 
that unifies the organ as the one object in the first place.
No objects in themselves
Nevertheless, an organ like a heart or eye is not an isolated object-in-itself 
defined by its indwelling function. Functions only make sense in a wider 
context. It will be one of my major points that all norms make sense only in a 
context. To say a heart is constituted by its function is to refer the entity to the 
organism of which it is a functioning part. If, per impossibile, an entity were 
miraculously to come into existence in outer space which had the shape of a 
heart and could actually pump blood, it still would not be a heart. For one 
thing, there would be no blood to pump. And if we created a red liquid for it to 
pump, it would not be blood, for blood is also defined functionally, as a liquid 
that carried nutrients to tissues -- and there are no tissues! For us to create a 
heart, we would have to create a whole body, otherwise the created object 
could not be a "heart." Only in the context of an organism can there be an 
organ with a function.
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Evolutionary context of functions
Besides the synchronous context of the organism, biological norms have a 
second, diachronic context: their evolutionary history. Only because ancestor 
organisms with hearts survived better in the past have descendants been 
designed by evolution to have hearts. It is the evolutionary design context that 
constitutes hearts as having their function. A purely mechanistic, causal 
account can explain why this heart, at this moment, is in fact pumping blood. 
The mechanistic account, however, cannot explain why the heart has the 
function of pumping blood, why it's supposed to pump blood. This is a 
normative issue. Only appeal to the historical context, the evolutionary 
adaptations of the species can account for the heart having the function that it 
does.6
3 Norms of Linguistic Life 
Linguistic life is as normative as biological life. The phonemes of any 
language are a set of ideal sounds, or contrasts between sounds, that set 
norms for individual speakers. The actual sounds speakers make attempt to 
obey these rules, though in reality no two speakers' sound waves are identical 
in the actual event. Similarly, on the syntactical level, each language has rules 
of grammar. Such rules are not so much descriptive -- in everyday speech 
people are constantly uttering incomplete or malformed sentences -- as 
prescriptive: the rules divide utterances into those with correct and with 
incorrect grammar. 
Brandom extends the normativity of language to the semantic level. He 
offers an account of the meaning of assertions in terms of the commitments a 
speaker makes for future utterances and actions. If someone says, "There's a 
tiger in the street" we attribute to them certain commitments: that they will 
say, "It has stripes"; that they will become fearful and run away. If the speaker 
says instead that it is pure white, and then picks it up and swallows it, we begin
to wonder if perhaps the speaker's assertion is making the kinds of 
commitments we would make by uttering the sounds, "There is an aspirin in 
the street." The "conceptual meaning" of an assertion, for Brandom, is the set 
of things the speaker is committing herself to. More precisely, the meaning of a
linguistic assertion is the set of commitments the speaker should be 
committing herself to. Meaning is normative. The linguistic community 
establishes rules. What we call "the meaning of an utterance" is a normatively 
constituted object: it is what the speaker should mean by the sounds uttered.7 
For Brandom, the linguistic community enforces the rules that constitute 
meaning by various sanctions. Someone who often utters, "There is a wolf," 
when the rest of us believe there is no wolf, will eventually be stripped of their 
credibility. That is, we will no longer take them as committing themselves to 
the expected implications of their utterances. Put more simply: we will treat the
sounds they make as meaningless. We will exile them from the linguistic 
community and treat their utterances as we do the sounds of parrots. Of 
course, there are other possible sanctions we could use: we could also beat 
such a person with sticks. 
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Accounts of social norms based on behavioural sanctions, whether with 
sticks or by exile, cannot be used, however, to reduce meaning to any purely 
factual pattern. Brandom argues that semantic norms can only be constructed 
if we use the sanctions correctly, that is, in a way that establishes the rules. 
Sanctioning someone when they say, "Wolf," will only work to enforce the 
communal meaning of the assertion if we sanction solely when there is no wolf 
present. Sanctioning every time the word is uttered, or at random, will not lead
to a linguistic community. The sanctioning must itself follow rules, that is, it 
must itself be normative. He claims that we cannot explain the normativity of 
language by reducing it to a non-normative, purely factual description of a 
behavioural pattern. As Brandom puts it, it is "norms all the way down."8
The objects of linguistic life -- phonemes, grammatical patterns, assertions -- 
are therefore constructed as normative. They are, in this respect, analogous to 
biological organs. It is not that there are prior-existing objects, such as 
sentences, to which meaning is added like a superficial layer of paint to their 
surfaces. Linguistic objects are normative through and through. Their 
normativity comes from their context, the linguistic community, similar to the 
way that organs are constituted normatively within the context of the organism
and its evolutionary history. 
4 Norms in the life of the Self 
The life of a self is also normative. The injunction, "Get a life!" is not 
addressed to a corpse. It is only addressed to a being that already has organic 
life, and that is already living in a linguistic community. The self is more than 
the body, even a body with language.9
What is this "more?" 
A self is unified over time: I am the same self yesterday as tomorrow. As 
Locke points out, if this were not the case, it would make no sense to reward or
punish someone today for what they did yesterday. One could, of course, think 
of this identity over time as the identity of a substance: there is one "thing" -- 
an ego, a mind -- that persists over time and is the subject of properties. Locke,
Parfit and others have shown why this substantialist approach is untenable, 
and have proposed instead a persistence based on memory, on experience. 
Recent "narrative" accounts of selfhood develop this notion and understand the
self as a linguistic level entity, constructed by the story of one's history. The 
unity of a self is the unity of a narrative.10
While I think there is much to be said for this narrative theory, in its typical 
form it misses the normative nature of being a self. In a number of recent 
papers, inspired partly by Ricoeur's distinction between idem-identity and ipse-
identity, I have laid out an account of selfhood based on responsibility rather 
than memory.11 A self is a current structure that faces the world by interpreting
perception and selecting actions on the basis of its own personality: its values, 
expectations, and so on. While this current structure has come to be on the 
basis of past experience, understanding the relationship to the past as purely 
factual or causal, or even as a pure memory of events, is inadequate. Against 
any pure narrative theory, I hold that the current structure which makes up a 
self is a result of decisions and commitment. Today I value giving you $10 
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because yesterday I made a promise to do so. I am not caused to give you $10 
by the memory of things I said yesterday. I give you the money in fulfillment of 
an obligation I engaged myself in yesterday. I give a philosophy lecture 
because I committed myself to an academic career decades ago. I speak truly 
because I have constructed myself as an honest person over a lifetime. 
Unlike the simple memory/narrative approach, my account is intrinsically 
normative. I give the money or the lecture, I speak the truth, because I should. 
I don't mean that I should morally (although that may be a part of it). I mean 
that who I am, the self to which I want to be faithful, the self whose integrity is 
at stake, is the set of norms I have constructed for myself (with a little help 
from my friends,) it is the set of things I should do and think because this has 
become my nature, this is who I am.12 I may fail to live up to these norms, but 
in so far as I fail, I am not being myself. That's the point of the injunction to "Be
thyself." This is not a purely subjective, isolationist approach: Responsibility is 
an attributed status. It is attributed to me by a social community that holds me 
responsible for what I say and do. As soon as, during development, I become 
enough of a self to do so, I also attribute responsibility to myself. 
The persistence of my self over time is not like the dead-weight of a rock 
(idem-identity) but is a continuous self-constitution in so far as today I hold 
myself (and am held) responsible for the promises I made, the acts I 
performed, and the beliefs I endorsed yesterday. Responsibility to 
commitments is primary: it constitutes self-identity over time and is not just a 
secondary property attached to a pre-existing unity. It is because I am 
responsible for my promises and actions, it is because I am responsible for my 
beliefs and thoughts, that they are "mine." The norms are not addons that 
supplement a pre-existing substantial ego: the norms that guide my life are 
what construct me as a self in the first place. A self is as normative an entity as
an organic organ or a sentence in a language. 
PART TWO
1 Intra/Extra-systemic Norms
Three approaches to norms
I have argued so far that life is intrinsically normative, although the norms 
are different for different kinds of life. In the rest of this paper, I want to explore
the relationship of these norms to each other. There are three approaches one 
could take: reduction of norms of one kind to another; absolute separation or 
autonomy of the different kinds of norms; or a middle course, the golden mean,
which I wish to defend. My claim is that we must understand linguistic norms 
and the norms of the self on the basis of evolutionary and historical 
developments, but that such an understanding is not reductionist. To work out 
what such a middle course could be, I will look first at linguistic norms, and 
then at norms of the self.
Language
Language is an evolutionary adaptation: it persists because it gives a species
with language some reproductive advantage. It is an organic function whose 
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possession is a norm for humans: a dysfunctional language module is as much 
a defect as a dysfunctional heart. Brandom claims that the norms of a linguistic
community go all the way down, that we cannot give a non-normative account 
of the behaviour of a linguistic community. He does not thereby mean to deny 
the theory of evolution. Language is an evolutionary development governed by 
adaptive norms, but each language is governed by its own internal norms. How
do these fit together?
The reductive approach won't work. We cannot account for the norm, in 
English, that a verb must agree with its noun -- "dogs runs" is grammatically 
wrong -- by appeal to the adaptive function of language. We have some 6000 
extant languages, each with distinctive rules. If the norms of language derive 
from survival pressure, should not all languages have the same rules? One 
could argue that since some language groups have more speakers than others 
-- those that are extinct have none -- some grammars must be biologically 
superior to others. That English and Mandarin have more speakers than Irish or
Beotuck might be explained by hypothesizing that their rules are more 
adaptive. I think this argument is implausible. The contemporary predominance
of Mandarin and English is due not to biological adaptation but to accidents of 
history and politics, of wars and empire, of available resources and technology,
and so on – all factors extraneous to the grammatical norms. The availability of
coal and protein led to the expansion of the British Empire and so its language, 
the Queen's English, was widely dispersed. 
In other words, contingency slips in. That one set of grammatical rules rather
than another gets replicated has little or nothing to do with the nature of these 
norms as such. We cannot understand why the norms of English are such as 
they are by looking to the replicability of the British Empire, or, what is even 
less likely, the replicability of Homo sapiens. We can say that the possession of 
language as such is governed by the functional norms of adaptation, and that 
for it to be a language, there must be some internal norms, but the particular 
norms cannot themselves be accounted for by the survival of the carrier. So 
while evolutionary norms give us some understanding about language, there is 
an insulation, an explanatory divide, between the forms of life. This divide 
prevents us reducing the linguistic norms to the biological ones. 
Self
The norms of selfhood are protected from biological norms in a similar way. 
A reductionist might argue that, since humans are animals, biological norms 
govern not only my animal life, but my human life too and so my choice of 
career, who I mate with, what I spend my time on, etc. are all ultimately 
governed by their contribution to my survival and reproduction. We may, in a 
kind of Freudian, self-deceptive way, interpret our behaviour in terms of pursuit
of philosophy, of romantic love or of the aesthetic value of music, but these are
just sublimations of the real drivers of my actions. The truth is that I need a 
salary so I can eat and keep my body alive. The truth is that I have a sexual 
instinct aimed at reproduction and being a philosopher makes me attractive to 
the opposite sex. From this point of view -- perhaps this is what 
"sociobiologists" hold -- norms of the self are a superficial appearance that can 
be reduced to the underlying reality: biological norms.13
I reject this reductionist position. My claim is that my self, as a set of current 
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norms, is based on the promises I've made and the honest character I have 
constructed in my narrative history. I might have become a different self. 
During adolescence, I could have been enticed by the image of myself as a 
wheeler-dealer who, if successful, could become rich at the expense of others. 
If I had committed myself to such a norm, I might well judge as "successful" my
skipping out with the $10 I promised. "There's a sucker born every moment." 
The choice as to which kind of character I would become, that is, which 
values I would adopt as my norms in future, depended on many contingencies: 
the gang I ran with as a teenager; the culture I was brought up in; my hormonal
levels; the personality of my teacher; which novels I read; and so on. By 
contingencies, I mean factors that are not necessitated by the biological norms 
of survival and reproduction. That is, the norms that constitute my narrative 
selfhood are no more determined by organic norms than the rules of English 
syntax are governed by the biological norm of species survival.
So I do not escape reductionism by adopting the alternative extreme -- the 
position that appeals to eternal, non-natural norms that comes to us from 
elsewhere, maybe from Beyond (that which "transcends"), as if human norms 
float free from our biology. My appeal is to the contingencies of the history of a 
self. 
My middle course wants it both ways. Selfhood is an evolved, biological, 
adaptive function. The construction of individual selves governed by their own 
internal discipline, responsible for their own characters and actions, is an 
adaptation that has helped the species flourish. Selfhood is a biological 
function just as language is. Both contribute to the biological replication of the 
species. But the norms of this organic function do not regulate what norms a 
self establishes for itself. That people take up careers that they stick with long 
enough to become proficient is biologically adaptive. That I might commit 
myself to a life of philosophy fits within this scheme, but is not determined by 
it. The adaptive nature of selfhood as an institution does not mean that 
biological norms reach up into the self and dictate its norms any more than the
adaptive norms of language in general necessitate the grammar of English.
System 
To understand my middle course, we must distinguish intra- and extra-
systemic norms. By a system I mean a unified context within which norms 
make sense. So an organism, such as the human body, is a system to which 
the functional norm that the heart should pump blood is referred. Without the 
organism, the heart could not have a function; it would not be a heart. So with 
respect to the organism as context, the norms for the heart are intra-systemic. 
Similarly, grammatical norms are intra-systemic with respect to a language as 
a system. Yet a system as a whole may have a role in a larger structure, which 
may itself establish norms: "extra-systemic" norms. In so far as language (like 
the heart) is a biological adaptation, it is governed by adaptive, biological 
norms. It is functionally normative that humans have language: humans who 
lost their linguistic capacity would be defective just as ones whose hearts 
failed. Syntax is adaptive; nevertheless biological adaptation doesn't determine
specific syntactical structures. My general thesis is that, due to contingency, 
extra-systemic norms do not govern intra-systemic norms. 
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In the same way, humans who lost their capacity to be selves are abnormal 
by reference to biological norms that are external to the system of selfhood. 
Nevertheless a self is a system with its own internal norms that cannot be 
derived from the norms of biology. Failure to fulfill a promise is one thing; the 
loss of the capacity to make promises is another. The first violates a norm 
internal to the self; the second violates a norm external to the self. 
In the middle way I am trying to develop, extra-systemic norms may place 
constraints on a system. At the very least, they say whether the system should 
exist in the first place. But I am arguing that contingent factors create a gap 
between extra- and intra-systemic norms such that extra-systemic norms 
cannot establish specific intra-systemic norms. The external norms do not 
reach through to the system's internal norms; it does not micro-manage them. 
The normativity of the system as a whole does not necessitate the particular 
norms of the elements internal to the system. This allows room for contingent 
factors to influence the establishment of intra-systemic norms.14
2 Modes of Understanding
So can the origin of norms be understood? Contingency may protect the 
norms of selfhood or of language from being reduced to biological norms, but 
does it do so at the cost of making their origin unintelligible? Does it not also 
mean that they cannot be explained, that their origin is mysterious? Brandom's
quip, "It's norms all the way down" suggests that the norms established by a 
linguistic community have a kind of a brute facticity impenetrable to 
understanding. 
It depends what we mean by "understanding." One way to understand 
something is to see how it is necessary. Mechanists, modelling understanding 
on logical and geometric demonstration, assume that to explain physical 
events is to show how they necessarily follow from the laws of physics. Given 
the laws of gravity, a planet's path around its sun must be an ellipse. But we 
cannot understand life this way. Life involves a greater or lesser dose of 
contingency and can only be understood by taking this into account. 
For example, we can explain in retrospect how lactose-intolerance came to 
be abnormal. Around 5000 years ago, European herders of cattle did not have 
the gene for the enzyme lactaze, which is needed to digest the lactose in milk. 
One individual had a genetic mutation so that they produced lactaze, which 
made it possible for them to drink milk. The adaptive advantage led to higher 
rates of replication in their offspring, so now the presence of lactaze in their 
European descendants has become a functional norm and its absence a 
disease to be cured. The original mutation may have been caused by an error 
in a gene during reproduction, or maybe it was due to DNA damage from 
cosmic rays. The physical cause of the mutation, however, is irrelevant to our 
evolutionary understanding of how the presence of lactaze became a functional
norm. While the event was necessitated by the laws of physics, it was purely 
contingent from the viewpoint of evolution. Whether or not we understand 
what physical laws determined the original mutation (or if we believed it was 
due to quantum indeterminacy or even to divine intervention) makes no 
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difference to our ability to understand the evolution of lactaze. Our 
understanding of lactose tolerance as a norm accepts the event as orthogonal 
chance and integrates this contingent event into our explanation. That for 
many of non-European origin lactose-intolerance does not count as 
pathological highlights the contingency of the lactaze norm.
In linguistic life we can understand how the norms of English emerged due to
extra-systemic events that were not governed by the internal norms of the 
system: the history of the Indo-European languages, the interaction between 
the Saxons and the Celts, the role of French-speaking Normans, etc. led to the 
system of norms we call "English." 
It is similar in understanding the life of a self. Ricoeur presents narrative 
selfhood as the integration of chance elements into an ongoing, coherent life. 
He bases the insight on Aristotle's account of mythos as the incorporation of 
extraneous happenings into the unifying story of the drama. The impingement 
of orthogonally random events on a system does not render the system 
unintelligible. As long as we understand what the system does with the 
impinging events, we can explain what has happened. Ricoeur's model for the 
understanding of a narrative life allows for a mode of understanding in which 
chance elements, themselves left unexplained, do not undermine the 
understanding of the coherent whole into which they are incorporated.
Let me call this "understanding by contingency" to distinguish it from the 
mechanistic paradigm of "understanding by necessity." Understanding in the 
first sense is the project of showing how chance events are involved in setting 
systems of norms. Understanding by contingency is non-deterministic, non-
predictive and non-reductive. My claim is that this is the appropriate model for 
understanding organisms and languages, as well as selves -- for understanding 
life.15
3 Conclusion 
Let me summarize. First, I've argued that life is normative -- at least the 
three areas of life I've discussed: biology, language, and selfhood. Life is 
therefore different than physical nature as it is conceived by 17th and 18th 
century mechanists. (Contemporary physics is, of course, a quite different 
matter; most tenets of mechanism were dropped during the 20th century.) 
Second, I've explored the relation between these three regimes of norms, and 
opted for a middle course between absolute independence between the 
regimes and the reduction of language and selfhood norms to biological ones. 
Finally I have claimed that this middle course allows us to explain the origin of 
the norms of language and self, provided we reject mechanism’s claim that 
explanation has to show why something is necessary and broaden our idea of 





1  As Brandom puts it (interpreting Pufendorf), mechanism holds that "These 
norms are not part of the intrinsic nature of things, which is entirely indifferent 
to them. ... Our activity institutes norms, imposes normative significances on a 
natural world that is intrinsically without significance for the guidance or 
assessment of action. A normative significance is imposed on a nonnormative 
world, like a cloak thrown over its nakedness, by agents forming preferences, 
issuing orders, entering into agreements, praising and blaming, esteeming and 
assessing." (Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit, 48). Brandom himself rejects 
this view, siding rather with Heidegger, whom he quotes: "In interpreting, we 
do not so to speak, throw a 'signification' over some naked thing that is 
present-at-hand, we do not stick a value on it." (Heidegger, Being and Time, 
sec. 32, p.190.) Cited by Brandom, Making It Explicit. p.661n64.
2  These paragraphs are a very brief summary of issues I have discussed at 
more length elsewhere.  See, for instance, my paper “A Brief History of 
Mind,” 2006.
3  The etymological origin of function refers to a public office. (Latin "fungio" 
means I perform an office.)
4  An alternative way of making the same point:
Mary (my guest):  What's that noise?
Me:  There's a sump pump in my basement that just came on.
Mary:  What's a sump pump?
Me:  A sump is a hole in the basement floor in which water collects when the basement 
gets wet.  I have a pump that comes on automatically when there's water in the sump 
and it pumps the water out into the drain.  
Mary:  Does it function all the time?
Me:  No. It works intermittently.  Once it empties the sump, it turns off until the water 
collects again to a certain level. You just heard it functioning; that's the noise you heard.
Mary:  So what's its function?
Me:  Its function is to keep my basement dry.
Mary:  But do you only want your basement dry intermittently?
Me:  What?  No, I want it dry all the time.  That's the function of the pump: to keep my 
basement dry all the time.
Mary:  But I thought you said it only functioned intermittently?
Me:  The function of the sump-pump is to keep my basement dry, day in and day out. 
The way it functions is by functioning some of the time and not functioning other times. 
Mary:  ???
“Function” has numerous confusing meanings in this dialogue:
Function = what it's for = purpose for which it is designed
Function = how it does what it does = the way it carries out its purpose
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Function = functioning = it is now doing what it does  = the mechanism is 
currently operating.
Compare:
The function of a heart is to pump blood.
The functioning of the heart = the way it functions = Blood gets pumped by muscles 
being stimulated by nerves so that ventricles contract and relax.  
It just functioned!  That pulse was the heart contracting, the muscles working. Between 
pulses, the heart relaxes and doesn't function. Yet both the contracting and relaxing are
functional.
5 “The eye is a matter of vision, and if vision fails there is no eye, except in an 
equivocal sense, as for instance a stone or painted eye.” (Aristotle, On the 
soul, 412 b 20)
6   See my paper, “Causal, Teleological and Evolutionary Explanation” 2008
7 Brandom claims here to be inspired by Kant's doctrine that concepts are 
normative. "The distinction between normative and non-normative vocabulary 
claims, and facts is itself drawn in normative terms. In this sense, the story is 
one in which it is norms all the way down -- a Kantian story ..." (Making It 
Explicit 625) 
8  Brandom, Making It Explicit, 625
9  "Rational choice introduces a whole new sense of life, a new sense in which 
a person can be said to 'have a life.' And -- importantly-- it is in this sense that 
we primarily have in mind when we say of someone that he lived well or 
badly. ..." Christine Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency, 143. 
10   This discussion is a very brief summary of a position I have worked out in 
more detail in a number of my other papers.  See, for instance:
“Selfhood and Rationality” 2003
“Intuition by Whom? Responsibility and the Role of the Self”  2004
“Constructing Responsibility” 2009
11   Paul Ricoeur's Oneself as Another is articulated around the distinction 
between these two modes of identity. His most explicit exposition is on pages 
115 to 125. 
12   “The specifically human function is a life of activity in accordance with 
such principles: a life, as we might put it now in which your actions are shaped 
and directed by your values." Christine Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency, 
148.
13   For Korsgaard, who is thinking in Aristotelian terms, this is the question 
whether what is good for a man coincides with being a good man. In my terms 
this is, "whether living up to my own norms as a self coincides with fulfilling my
norms as a biological and cultural entity." She says: "Even supposing that 
human beings do have a function, it is unclear why the good for a human being
should reside in the good performance of the human function. Granted that a 
ENDNOTES
human being who performs the human function well is (in some sense) a good 
human being, we can still ask whether it is good for a human being to be a 
good human being. We can ask whether it will make the person happy, in a 
recognizable sense having something to do with pleasure, or with the quality of
the person's experience, or at least with some condition welcome from the 
person's own point of view." (The Constitution of Agency 131). Korsgaard 
argues that, for Aristotle, that there is no external function for a human: a 
person's function is the fulfillment of what they intrinsically are. But from a 
Darwinian perspective, humans, like all organisms, do have an external 
function, to replicate. Reconciling the norms of the self with the norms of 
organic life is therefore more acute in the post-Darwinian context.
14   As Heath puts it, speaking of cultural norms, "...once cultural transmission 
is in place, the forces of biological selection cannot "reach through" and 
determine the content of particular intentional states, simply because the 
structure of the cultural platform is so fitness enhancing that it permits the 
transmission of all sorts of content that is biologically maladaptive. ... biological
factors may contribute to the cultural fitness of a behaviour pattern, and thus 
exercise an influence on which patterns get selected, but they cannot act as a 
direct forces of selection." (Joseph Heath, Following the Rules, 260.)
15   This means, of course, that understanding a system involves seeing how 
past events have changed it. Past events don't just happen and then 
disappear: they change the world. A system is not just present at the moment; 
it cannot be understood except as a dynamic, temporally changing entity 
whose history is essential to it. 
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